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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
not an unreasonable exercise of such legislative prerogative to create
a new cause of action against a wrongdoer responsible for death by
means of which such wrongdoer is compelled to contribute to the
funds employed to effectuate the benevolent and charitable purposes
of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
SIDNEY MOERMAN.

AN APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
FOR PERSONAL SERVICES.

The general rule applicable under common law and under the
statutes 1 of the several states is that actions based on contract survive the death of either party and may be enforced by or against his
heirs or executors.2 It is with the exception to this well-established
exception found in contracts inrule that we are concerned-the
3
volving personal services.
That one may choose with whom he will contract is a basic principle of law. The courts early recognized 4 that when people contract
with each other for services essentially personal no assignment or
substitution can be satisfactory, and the original party cannot be
succeeded by his personal representative. A personal service contract
requires the exercise of personal skill and knowledge, it cannot be
delegated to another.3 The long line of authorities has led to the
crystallization of the rule in Lorillard v. Clyde,6 followed by later
decisions, in which the Court laid the test to determine whether a
given case fitted within this exception. The Court said:
"It is well settled that when performance depends on the
continued existence of a given person or thing and such continued existence was assumed as the basis of the agreement,
'New York State Decedent Estate Law, Sec. 16, L. 1909, ch. 18.
aC. J. 181, Sec. 326; Livermore v. Bainbridge, 49 N. Y. 125 (1872);
Zabriski v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322, 64 Amer. D. 551 (1855); Robinson v.
Thomas, 123 App. Div. 411, 107 N. Y. Supp. 110 (1908); McGregor v.
McGregor, 35 N. Y. 218 (1866); Allen v. Confederate Pub. Co., 49 S. E.
782, 121 Ga. 773 (1905) ; White v. Allen, 133 Mass. 423 (1882) ; McCartney
v. Corbine's Estate. 108 I1. App. 282 (1903).
'Lorillard v. Clyde et al., 142 N. Y. 456, 37 N. E. 489, 24 L. R. A. 113
(1894) ; Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62, 7 Amer. Rep. 415 (1871) ; Spaulding
v. Rosa, 71 N. Y. 40, 27 Amer. Rep. 7 (1877); Wheeler v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins.,
82 N. Y. 543, 37 Amer. Rep. 549 (1880); Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N. Y. 489,
44 N. E. 167 (1896).
'Babcock v. Goodrich, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) 52.
'3 Williston, Contracts 3299.
'Supra Note 3.

NOTES AND COMMENT
the death of the person or destruction of the thing puts an end
to the obligation."
With the doctrine as settled as it appears, its application has
proved more difficult than might be expected. The recent case of
Brearton v. DeWitt 7 is an interesting illustration.
Elden C. DeWitt innoculated Mae E. Brearton with the germs
of a serious disease. Six years later, December, 1925, both parties
entered into an agreement. Mrs. Brearton promised to give up her
position, isolate herself from her friends and subject herself to the
control of DeWitt for cures and treatment. In consideration DeWitt
was to pay Mrs. Brearton the sum of $1,000 a month for life. Payments were made from December, 1925 to May, 1926. March, 1927,
sixteen months after the agreement was entered into DeWitt died.
Mrs. Brearton attempted to collect from DeWitt's executors who
refused to pay; therefore, plaintiff brings an action for breach of
contract against DeWitt's estate.
Here a vital term of the plaintiff's obligation was to subject
herself to cures and treatments to be administered to her, by or under
the direction of DeWitt-that such treatment was to come from
DeWitt personally. Plaintiff could not possibly have meant to subject
herself to the treatment determined by DeWitt's executors.
In the Appellate Division Judge O'Malley wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Judge Finch concurred, arguing that the agreement
survives because in addition to personal services the agreement involves a non-personal element, namely, an obligation to pay money,
which was founded upon a consideration fully executed on plaintiff's part.
The contract seems to be entire, the consideration on plaintiff's
side being her isolation and subjection for the whole period of her
life to enable defendant's testator to attempt cures by personal supervision and direction. We cannot say that her carrying out of her part
of the agreement for one month or sixteen months was proportionate
to $1,000 or $16,000. It is analogous to the case of a builder who
agrees to build a house. For convenience the agreement may provide
for payment in installments as the work progresses, but that does not
say that the contract is not entire or that the work completed is
proportionat6 to the amount paid. We do not believe that "the
obligation to pay money is founded upon a consideration fully
executed," but, as Judge Proskauer points out in the prevailing opinion, that by DeWitt's death "plaintiff was no longer able to perform
an important part of her obligation."
It was held on motion for a judgment on the pleadings that the
complaint must be dismissed on the grounds that the contract is so
'234 N. Y. Supp. 716 (May, 1929).
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essentially personal
in its nature that no obligation survives the death
8
of the promisor.
We have found that this is a personal service contract. We have
discovered that the general rule in New York and throughout the
United States is that contracts involving personal service do not survive. The tendency of our courts is to abide by the rule laid down by
precedent and judicial opinion where common justice and public
policy do not demand a change.
The rule may seem harsh when we consider that the plaintiff is
living a life of torture, unable to associate with friends and companions and with no means of support. But the inoculation took
place six years prior to this agreement and formed no part of the
consideration. The plaintiff knew what she was contracting for and,
in our opinion, no injustice was wrought. It must be borne in mind
that practical justice can only be the measure of what would be fair
in the greatest number of cases.
Public policy in this case, far from being a reason for disregarding precedent, demands that the law should not be changed. The
state is constantly endeavoring to improve health conditions and the
courts should encourage this good work by refusing its aid to desperate persons, unwise persons--criminal offenders who, for pecuniary compensation, agree knowingly and foreseeingly to contracts
which endanger their own health and that of the community. If we
should allow recovery to this plaintiff who subjected herself absolutely to the control of a person to do as he saw fit, experimenting to
the injury of her health, it would encourage other people to do likewise in similar cases.
THOMAS

E.

SAVINGS BANK TRUST DEPOSITS AND CREDITORS'

McDADE.

RIGHTS.

It is today the law of this jurisdiction that where A deposits
money in a savings bank in his own name, in trust for B, it does not
in itself establish an irrevocable trust, during the life-time of the
depositor, but is merely a tentative trust, revocable at the depositor's
will, until his death or until such time as he completes the gift in his
life-time by some unequivocal act or declaration. At his death a presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to those funds
'It might well be contended however that at the death of DeWitt, plaintiff's obligation under the contract had been fulfilled. The main object of the
agreement being to allow him to experiment on her physical person, it follows
that there was nothing more for her to do in pursuance of the contract, because
the contemplated purpose of the contract had been effected.

